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Abstract 
In this paper, an interbank market with a large number of local banks is modelled. Because of costly interbank 
borrowing, individual local banks choose to over-invest in liquid reserves, and there is an aggregate surplus of such 
reserves across the banking system. This liquidity surplus is utilized by second-tier, correspondent banks which invest 
it in more productive, less liquid assets. The two-tier banking system, however, is more prone to panic runs because of 
the increased interbank dependence and the reduced aggregate liquidity. Government intervention may therefore be 
more important to maintain stability of the two-tier system. 
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Introduction♦ 
Historically, United States banks were restricted in 
one form or another form of branching across 
states as well as within them1. Such branching 
restrictions created a banking system that consisted 
of a large number of local banks (first-tier banks) 
co-existing with a small number of national banks 
(second-tier, correspondent banks). If there were 
lessons to be learned from this experience, we must 
understand how such a two-tier banking system 
might affect credit allocation by individual banks 
and the financial stability of this banking system. 
This latter issue is particularly important since the 
U.S. banking system was subject to periodic 
banking panics prior to the enactment of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act in the 1930s2. More 
broadly, the analysis here could also have 
implications for the global banking system where 
individual countries erect barriers to entry by 
foreign banks into their domestic markets. Such 
barriers, however, might give rise to a global 
liquidity surplus which might motivate the rise of 
global correspondent banks. To examine these 
important issues, I model an economy that initially 
consists of a large number of independent local 
(unit) banks. As long as there is a well-functioning 
interbank market having little deadweight loss, unit 
banking and, for that matter, branching restrictions, 
would have no impact on the allocation of credit by 
individual banks. This is also the case even if there 
is asymmetric information about individual banks' 
investment opportunities and their liquidity needs. 
However, bank credit allocations can be 
substantially affected if interbank borrowing by 
unit banks is to incur significant costs, for 
                                                 
♦© Jianping Qi (2008). 
I am grateful to Kerry Back, George Benston, Mitch Berlin, Doug Diamond, 
Phil Dybvig, George Kanatas, and Chris Lamoureux for helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
1 Interstate branching restrictions were internally dismantled in the 
United States with the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act in 1994. 
2 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for a comprehensive survey of the 
U.S. banking history. 
example, as a result of monitoring by interbank 
lenders. In this environment, banks must 
individually increase their liquid reserves and the 
unit banking system as a whole will accumulate a 
surplus of such reserves. I show that this reserve 
surplus can give rise to second-tier banks that 
function as correspondent banks of unit banks by 
utilizing the surplus reserves. Because of the 
increased interbank dependence and the reduced 
aggregate liquidity reserves, the two-tier banking 
system is shown to be more prone to banking 
panics. A large number of papers have studied 
bank runs and the stability of banking systems, 
including Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), and 
Smith (1991). While this literature provided many 
important insights, relatively few have focused 
specifically on the role of interbank markets3. 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) examine interbank 
risk sharing and show that a competitive interbank 
market cannot achieve the first-best allocation 
because of individual banks' incentive to reduce 
liquidity reserves. A central bank that provides 
restricted interbank borrowing is shown to be able 
to improve welfare by imposing a regulatory 
reserve requirement that mitigates the under-
reserve problem. In contrast, the analysis here is 
independent of risk sharing consideration. It is the 
need for interbank borrowing arising from 
uncertain loan demands that causes individual 
banks to over-invest in liquid reserves. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The 
model is set up in Section 1. In Section 2, interbank 
borrowing costs are shown to cause unit banks to over-
invest in liquid reserves and, as a result, the system of 
unit banks will accumulate a liquidity surplus. In 
Section 3, a two-tier bank is shown to mitigate this 
liquidity surplus problem. Section 4 discusses the 
model's policy implications. The last section 
concludes. All proofs are contained in Appendix A. 
                                                 
3 Exceptions are, for example, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Chari 
(1989), Smith (1991), and Allen and Gale (2000). 
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1. The model setup 
Consider an economy with three dates, t = 0; 1; 2, or 
two time periods, between t = 0 and 1 and between  
t = 1 and 2. There are a large number of ex ante 
identical local banks (unit banks). A unit bank is 
small in size and operates in a local community. At  
t = 0, the bank receives aggregate deposits in the 
amount of one unit of the economy's sole 
consumption good and nothing at any other date. 
The economy is universally risk neutral, and since 
risk sharing is not the focus of this analysis, all 
individual deposits will mature at t = 2. Consistent 
with a competitive banking system, I also assume 
that a bank maximizes the welfare of its depositors, 
as it must provide them with best possible deals. 
There are two investment technologies that are 
publicly available in the economy. The first is a 
liquid technology that will pay off one unit for every 
unit invested in it for one period. The second is an 
illiquid technology that will pay off rq > 1 units for 
every unit invested in it for two periods. The illiquid 
investment will pay off only ru ∈ (0; 1) if it is 
interrupted in one period. 
A bank also has access to a technology that is only 
privately available in its own community, possibly 
as a result of the bank's local know how. I introduce 
this private technology to capture possible 
opportunity costs associated with individual banks' 
liquidity constraint which may cause them to 
abandon good investments. Specifically, the private 
technology's payoff is as follows. For every unit a 
bank invests in its own private technology at t = 0, a 
proportion ∈θ  (0; 1) of it will turn out to be good at 
t = 1, and the rest, θ−1 , will be bad. 
The payoff to the good portion will depend on 
whether the bank upgrades this investment at t = 1. 
Upgrading one unit of the good investment will 
require additional φ > 0 units of investment at t = 1, 
and the per unit payoff of the upgraded investment 
will be rp > rq at t = 2. Thus, given the upgrading, 
the payoff at t = 2 to the 1+φ  total good investment 
will be (1+φ )rp. If any part of the good investment 
is not upgraded at t = 1, this part will also turn bad. 
The payoff to the bad investment will be zero. 
For an individual bank, the proportion θ  is a 
random variable. However, the aggregate realization 
of θ  by all n banks is non-stochastic. In particular, 
if iθ  is bank i's realized θ , then θθ nni i =∑ −1 , where 
θ  is the mean of random variable θ . Although the 
assumption of an aggregate certainty seems 
restrictive, this simplifying assumption does not 
trivialize the problem. Indeed, in spite of the 
aggregate certainty, the results show that individual 
banks may still choose to over-invest in the liquidity 
technology. In the analysis, I also assume that 
information about a bank's investment portfolio and 
its realized θ  is only privately known by the bank. 
There is no market for any bank's investment claims 
at either t = 0 or t = 1. 
Consider now the choice problem of a bank, say, 
bank i, i { }n,...,2,1∈ . Let 0≥iS , 0≥iQ , and 0≥iP  
denote, respectively, the bank's investment at t = 0 
in the liquid, the illiquid, and the private technology. 
Upon learning its realized iθ  at t = 1, bank i will 
choose a portion, [ ]ii θα ,0∈ , of its good investment 
to upgrade and a portion [ ]ii QU ,0∈  of its illiquid 
investment to liquidate. In general, the early 
liquidation of the illiquid investment may be 
desirable because of possibly costly interbank 
borrowing. Accordingly, bank i can be a net 
borrower or a net lender in the interbank market. Let ( )∞∞−∈ ,iB  denote the bank's net borrowing from 
the interbank market at t = 1, and let γ  be the 
required payoff at t = 2 per unit borrowing in the 
interbank market. Clearly, interbank loans must in 
equilibrium have 1≥γ . Thus, the required net 
payment of interbank loans by bank i's is Bi at t = 2, 
which is negative if the bank is a net lender. With a 
net borrowing amount of Bi, bank i may incur 
additional costs at t = 2, which is denoted by m(Bi). I 
will interpret such costs and specify the cost 
function in the next section. 
As usual, I first formulate bank i's choice problem at 
t = 1, taking as given the bank's initial investment 
choices. Given γ , Pi, Qi, Si, and the bank's realized 
iθ , bank i will choose iα , Ui, and Bi to solve the 
following, problem (2.1), at t = 1: 
max ( ) ( ) ( ),1 iiqiipii BmBrUQrP −−−++ γφα     (1) 
s.t. ,iuiiii BrUSP ++≤φα      (2) 
,0 ii θα ≤≤         (3) 
ii QU ≤≤0 .        (4) 
In problem (2.1), expression (1) is bank i's interim 
payoff function, condition (2) is its interim resource 
constraint, and conditions (3) and (4) restrict iα  and 
Ui within the feasible regions. 
At t = 0, given the optimal choices of iα , Ui, and Bi 
from problem (2.1), bank i chooses Pi, Qi, and Si to 
solve the following problem (2.2): 
max ( ) ( ) ( )[ ],1  BmBrUQrPE iiqiipii −−−++ γφα    (5) 
s.t. ,1≤++ iii SQP        (6) 
.0,, ≥iii SQP         (7) 
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Expression (5) is bank i's expected payoff function, 
condition (6) is its initial resource constraint, and 
condition (7) is self-explanatory. 
Definition 1. An (rational expectations) interbank 
market equilibrium is a collection of 0≥γ , 0≥iP , 
0≥iQ , 0≥iS , [ ]ii θα ,0∈ , [ ]ii QU ,0∈  and ( )∞∞−∈ ,iB , for all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , such that 
1) given γ , Pi, Qi, Si, and iθ , bank i chooses iα , Ui, 
and Bi to solve problem (2.1); 
2) given γ  and the optimal iα , Ui, and Bi derived 
from problem (2.1), bank i chooses Pi, Qi, and Si to 
solve problem (2.2); and  
3) the interbank market clears at t = 1, or 
.0
1
=∑ =ni iB  
The first case of interest is a benchmark with 
costless interbank borrowing, i.e., m(Bi) = 0. In this 
case, the following result obtains. 
Proposition 1. Fix m(Bi) = 0. For rp sufficiently 
large, the unique interbank market equilibrium is, 
for all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , 
),1/()1( φθφθγ ++= pr  
),1/(1 φθ+=iP  
,0=iQ  
),1/( φθφθ +=iS  
,ii θα =  
,ii QU =  
.iiii SPB −= φθ  
Proposition 1 shows that with frictionless interbank 
borrowing, individual banks invest only in the liquid 
technology and their own private technology, and 
there is no investment in the publicly available 
illiquid technology. This is because the private 
technology is more productive than the illiquid one, 
while the liquid technology provides the necessary 
liquid funds for the interim upgrade of the private 
technology that turns out to be good. 
Then, given its realized iθ  in the interim, bank i will 
choose to upgrade all the good investment, 
facilitated by either borrowing or lending in the 
interbank market, depending on its net liquidity 
position. In equilibrium,  
.
11 ii
n
i i
n
i i
PnPS φθφθ ==∑∑ ==  That is, each bank's 
liquidity investment equals its expected liquidity 
needs, i.e., ,ii PS φθ=  and there is no aggregate 
liquidity surplus. Indeed, upon realizing iθ , bank i's 
interim liquidity needs are ii Pφθ . If iii SP >φθ , i.e., 
θθ >i , the bank is a net borrower of interbank 
funds, but if θθ <i , it is a net lender. 
The equilibrium investments characterized in 
Proposition 1 are identical to those of the first best. 
The first best investments are achieved when these 
choices maximize the aggregate payoff of the entire 
banking system, subject to the aggregate resource 
constraints at t = 0 and t = 1. Since all banks are 
identical and there is no aggregate uncertainty, the 
first-best maximization problem is identical to a 
planner maximizing the expected payoff of a 
representative bank, subject to the deterministic 
aggregate constraints on its initial and interim 
investments. In accordance with the previous 
notation, let S, Q, and P denote the representative 
bank's corresponding t = 0 investments in the liquid, 
illiquid, and private technologies, and let α  denote 
the portion of the good investment the bank chooses 
to upgrade at t = 1. With no aggregate uncertainty, 
the bank should not have to liquidate any investment 
prematurely. Thus, the planner simply chooses α , 
P, Q, and S to solve the following first-best problem 
(2.3): 
max ,QrPr)( qp++φα 1        (8) 
s.t. ,1≤++ SQP        (9) 
,SP ≤αφ       (10) 
,0 θα ≤≤       (11) 
.0,, ≥SQP       (12) 
Problem (2.3) integrates problems (2.1) and (2.2). 
The objective function (8) is similar to the earlier 
(1) and (5), except that Ui = 0 and that the planner is 
not concerned with interbank interest payments. 
Conditions (9) and (10) are the planner's resource 
constraints at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively. 
Conditions (11) and (12) restrict the choice 
variables within the feasible regions. 
Proposition 2. The first-best investments α , P, Q, 
and S are identical to the equilibrium investments 
iα , Pi, Qi, and Si in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 shows that even though individual 
banks' investments and liquidity needs are only 
privately known, the interbank market equilibrium 
will enable the first best. That is, with no costly 
interbank borrowing, bank investments would be 
unaffected by the unit banking structure and, for 
that matter, any branching restrictions would not 
be consequential. However, as will be seen 
shortly, if interbank borrowing is costly, the 
interbank market equilibrium will be substantially 
different, and so will be the interbank market 
structure. 
2. Costly interbank borrowing 
Suppose now there are costs associated with 
interbank borrowing. Such costs may be attributed 
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to, for example, information production and 
monitoring costs by interbank lenders. A standard 
moral hazard story would have interbank lenders 
carry out costly monitoring of borrowers in order to 
prevent the misuse of interbank loans1. Unless stated 
otherwise, the notations used in this section will be 
identical to those used earlier. In particular, if the 
amount of interbank borrowing is Bi by bank { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , its borrowing cost is now specified to be { ,0  if 2/ .0  if         0 2)( ≥<= ii iBkB BiBm     (13) 
Parameter k > 0 measures the costliness of this 
borrowing. Unlike the interest payment on an 
interbank loan, which has an expected net cost of 
zero, the borrowing cost m(Bi) is asymmetric and is 
a deadweight loss to the banking system. While the 
borrower incurs this cost, the lender does not benefit 
from it2. For tractability, I also specify the following 
probability distribution of iθ : for all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , { ,21 ,2/10 /y  probabilit      with y  probabilit        withi hθθ =    (14) 
with )1,0(  h ∈θ  and 2/hθθ = . To be consistent with 
deterministic aggregate liquidity needs, I assume 
that n is an even number and a half of all banks, i.e., 
n/2 banks, will realize hθ .  
Given m(Bi) and as specified in equations (13) and 
(14), the solutions to problems (2.1) and (2.2) can be 
derived. To facilitate exposition, a critical value of 
parameter k is defined below: 
.
)1(
))2()1()(2(
)(* φθφθ
γφθφθφθγ
hh
hphh rk +
+−++≡  
Proposition 3. Fix 0>γ . Then, for rp suffciently 
large and k > k*( γ ), the solutions to problems (2.1) 
and (2.2) have 
,
)1(
)2()1(
1
1
2φθ
γφθφθ
φθ h
hph
h
i k
r
P +
+−+++=  
,0=iQ  
,
)1(
)2()1(
1 2φθ
γφθφθ
φθ
φθ
h
hph
h
h
i k
r
S +
+−+−+=  
,ii θα =  { ,r  r  and    if     otherwise,   Qi quiiU ≤== γθ 00  
.
)1(
)2()1(
φθ
γφθφθφθ
h
hph
iiii k
r
SPB +
+−+=−=  
                                                 
1 Such costs may also be interpreted as non-pecuniary disutility imposed 
on borrowers because of consistent lender monitoring. 
2 The qualitative results would remain unchanged with other cost 
functions as long as they admitted a costly spread between borrowing 
and lending and m(:) were convex. 
Proposition 3 shows that individual banks will again 
choose only to invest in the private and the liquid 
technology. The restriction k > k*( γ ) is important 
here; it ensures that the interbank market 
equilibrium will result in over-investment in the 
liquid technology. The interbank equilibrium is 
characterized next. 
Proposition 4. For rp sufficiently large and k > k*(1), 
the unique interbank market equilibrium is the 
collection of γ  = 1 and the Pi, Qi, Si, iα , Ui, and Bi, 
for all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , as given in Proposition 3 with  
γ  = 1. 
Proposition 4 shows that with costly interbank 
borrowing, the equilibrium investments by banks 
are signficantly different from the first best. More 
importantly, the interbank market equilibrium now 
leads to over-investment in the liquid technology by 
individual banks and an aggregate liquidity surplus 
in the entire banking system. To see the later, note 
that the difference between the aggregate investment 
in the liquid technology and the interim liquidity 
needs for investment upgrading needs is 
( )
,0
)1(
))2()1()(2(
.
.
122
1
1 1
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+−++−
+=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=−∑ ∑
= =
φθ
φθφθφθφθ
φθφθφθ
h
hphh
h
h
n
i
n
i
ihiiii
k
r
nPSnPS
 
where the last inequality follows from k > k*(1). 
Intuitively, as the costliness, k, of interbank 
borrowing increases, the cost to the borrowing bank 
increases, but there is no corresponding gain to the 
lending bank. This problem is made worse because 
a bank's interim borrowing needs increase with its 
initial investment Pi in its own private technology. 
Thus, for a large k, individual banks are better off 
increasing their liquid investments and, as a 
consequence, the banking system accumulates 
surplus liquid funds. The equilibrium liquidity 
surplus, )2/( ihi PSn φθ− , is strictly increasing in k 
since Pi is decreasing in k while Si is increasing in it. 
Interestingly, the interbank equilibrium is unique 
because the interbank loan return must be γ  = 1. If 
γ  < 1, no one would want to lend, but if γ  > 1, the 
liquidity surplus would imply an excess supply of 
liquid funds. 
3. Two-tier banking 
Costly interbank borrowing has been to result in a 
surplus of liquid reserves by the unit banking 
system. In this section, I examine the emergence of 
second-tier banks that utilize the surplus funds. That 
is, I now examine the role of a unit-banks' bank – a 
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correspondent bank1. In accordance with the earlier 
assumptions of the technologies, a second-tier 
(correspondent) bank has access only to the 
economy's publicly available liquid and illiquid 
technologies. It has no access to a local community's 
private technology presumably because only the unit 
bank performs special services in the community it 
operates and these services cannot be easily 
transferred2. Since the second-tier bank invests only 
in the public technologies, the suppliers of this 
bank's funds need not engage in costly information 
production and monitoring. Thus, there are no 
borrowing costs associated with the second-tier 
bank's borrowing from unit banks3. 
As before, let Si, Qi, and Pi, { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , denote, 
respectively, unit bank i's investments in the liquid, 
the illiquid, and the private technology at t = 0. 
Unlike in Section 2, a unit bank can now deposit its 
liquid funds in the second-tier bank rather than 
investing them in the liquid technology directly. 
Thus, Si now refers to the amount of unit bank i's 
interbank deposits at t = 0. Since a unit bank's 
interim liquidity needs are only privately known, 
interbank deposits are in the form of demand 
deposits (as in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). If unit 
bank i realizes hi θθ =  at t = 1, it will first withdraw 
its interbank deposit Si to upgrade its good 
investment because, unlike interbank borrowing, 
deposit withdrawals incur no borrowing costs. If the 
withdrawal is insufficient to meet the liquidity 
needs, bank i will then borrow additional funds from 
the second-tier bank. Let iα now be the portion of 
the good investment bank i chooses to upgrade, and 
let Bi be its net interbank borrowing at t = 1, with the 
same interbank borrowing cost m(Bi). Also, let 
0≥γ  be the required return on interbank loans 
extended by the second-tier bank. As before, all 
payments are made at t = 2, except that interbank 
deposits can be withdrawn at the face value at t = 1. 
For unit bank i, { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , its investment choice 
problems are identical to problems (2.1) and (2.2). 
That is, given γ , Pi, Qi, Si, and its realized iθ , unit 
                                                 
1 Since the second-tier bank does not branch across communities, 
forming this bank does not breach branching restrictions. 
2 In this simple model, if the second-tier bank had access to the private 
technology, the optimal mechanism would have unit banks specialize in 
collecting deposits in their own communities and the second-tier bank 
specialize in investment. This is not empirically observed, however. In a 
richer model with scale-dependent technologies, the complete 
separation of deposit collection and investment would not be optimal. 
3 One reason why unit banking may lead to higher borrowing costs is 
that there is a greater difficulty involved in generating information 
regarding independent, small banks. In fact, the results of my model 
would be qualitatively unchanged even with some borrowing costs by 
the second-tier bank, as long as these costs were less than those incurred 
by unit banks. In the last section, I will discuss plausible reasons for the 
differential borrowing costs between the two types of banks. 
bank i chooses iα , Ui, and Bi at t = 1 to solve the 
following choice problem (4.1): 
 max ( ) ( ) ( ),1 iiqiipii BmBrUQrP −−−++ γφα  
s.t. ,iuiiii BrUSP ++≤φα  
 ,0 ii θα ≤≤  
 .0 ii QU ≤≤  
Given the optimal iα , Ui, and Bi from problem 
(4.1), bank i chooses Pi, Qi, and Si to solve the 
following choice problem (4.2): 
max ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,BmBrUQrPE iiqiipii −−−++ γφα 1  
s.t.  ,SQP iii 1≤++  
. S  ,Q  ,P iii 0≥  
Consider now the choice problem of the second-tier 
bank. Let 0≥cQ  denote the second-tier bank's 
investment in the illiquid technology at t = 0, and 
0≥cS  be its investment in the liquid technology. 
Consistent with a competitive two-tier banking 
system, the second-tier bank maximizes the 
aggregate payoff of the banking system and that all 
gains from two-tier banking are transferred to unit 
banks at t = 2. Then the second-tier bank chooses γ , 
Qc, and Sc to solve the following problem (4.3): 
max ( ) ( ) ( )( ) qcn
i
iqiipii rQBmrUQrP +−−++∑
=1
1 φθ , (15) 
s.t. ∑
=
≤+
n
i
icc SSQ
1
,     (16) 
c
n
i
ii SP ≤∑
=1
φα ,      (17) 
0,, ≥γ Q S cc .      (18) 
In problem (4.3), expression (15) describes the 
aggregate welfare of the two-tier banking system. 
Conditions (16) and (17) are the second-tier bank's 
initial resource and interim liquidity constraints, 
respectively. Condition (18) restricts the choice 
variables within the feasible regions. 
Definition 2. A two-tier banking equilibrium is a 
collection of 0≥γ , 0≥cQ , 0≥cS , 0≥iP , 0≥iQ , 
0≥iS , [ ]ii θα ,0∈ , [ ]ii QU ,0∈ , and ( )∞∞−∈ ,iB , for 
all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , such that  
1) given γ , Pi, Qi, Si, and iθ , unit bank i chooses 
iα , Ui, and Bi to solve problem (4.1); 
2) given γ  and the optimal iα , Ui, and Bi from 
problem (4.1), unit bank i chooses Pi, Qi, and Si to 
solve problem (4.2); and 
3) the second-tier bank chooses γ , Qc, and Sc to 
solve problem (4.3). 
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Since problems (4.1) and (4.2) are identical to the 
earlier problems (2.1) and (2.2), the result of 
Proposition 3 is applicable here. The two-tier 
banking equilibrium is now characterized. 
Proposition 5. For rp sufficiently large and k > k*(rq), 
the unique two-tier banking equilibrium is, for all { }ni ,...,2,1∈ , 
qr=γ , 
( ) ( )
( )21
21
1
1
φθ
φθφθ
φθ h
qhph
h
i
k
rr
P +
+−+++= , 
0=iQ , 
( ) ( )
( )21
21
1 φθ
φθφθ
φθ
φθ
h
qhph
h
h
i
k
rr
S +
+−+−+= , 
ii θα = , { ,  if   ,0  if     0 i hiiQiU θθθ ===  
iiii SPB −= φθ , 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= ihic PSnQ φθ2
1 , 
ihc P
nS φθ
2
= . 
It is interesting to note that the two-tier banking 
equilibrium has γ  = rq. This is because the 
opportunity cost for the second-tier bank is the 
illiquid investment, not the liquid one. As a result, 
each unit bank's investment under the two-tier 
banking system is different from that under the unit 
banking system. Importantly, the two-tier banking 
system improves the aggregate welfare because the 
unit banking equilibrium is feasible under two-tier 
banking but is not chosen. Intuitively, the second-
tier bank improves economic efficiency by utilizing 
the liquidity surplus accumulated by unit banks for 
more productive, less liquid investment. Indeed, the 
liquidity surplus, ( )2/ihi PSn φθ− , is completely 
utilized by the second-tier bank for its investment in 
the illiquid technology with ( )2/ihic PSnQ φθ−= , 
and the two-tier banking system, as a whole, no 
longer exhibits a liquidity surplus. Although the 
required return on interbank loans is γ  = rq > 1, 
individual unit banks are better off using the second-
tier bank. This is because competitive two-tier 
banking ensures that unit banks will receive all 
efficiency gains. 
4. Stability of two-tier banking 
While the two-tier banking system clearly improves 
economic efficiency, it is more vulnerable to 
banking panics because of the reduced aggregate 
liquidity reserves. Indeed, the second-tier bank will 
have to liquidate its illiquid investment prematurely 
if there are runs on interbank deposits. If some unit 
banks with no liquidity needs believe that others will 
withdraw their interbank deposits early, it is rational 
for these unit banks to do the same1. To see this, note 
that the maximal amount of interbank funds available 
to the second-tier bank at t = 1 is only 
iuihiihucc nSrPSnP
nrQS <⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=+ φθφθ
2
1
2
,  (19) 
where Qcru is the early liquidation value of Qc and 
the last inequality follows from ru < 1. Thus, if ru is 
small and a large number of unit banks choose to 
withdraw in the interim, there will not be enough 
funds available at t = 2. In the case of such runs on 
interbank deposits, a unit bank that has not 
withdrawn its deposits at t = 1 will receive nothing 
at t = 2. Therefore, anticipating such runs, all unit 
banks will want to make early withdrawals, thereby 
ensuring the banking panic. 
Two factors make such panic runs very costly for 
the second-tier banking system. First, the second-
tier bank will have to liquidate its illiquid 
investment prematurely. This cost can be substantial 
if ru is small. Second, there can be substantial costs 
to its respondent unit banks that have the good 
investment. Condition (19) implies that during 
banking panics, many unit banks will be unable to 
withdraw their deposits before the second-tier bank 
runs out of funds. If these unit banks are the ones 
with the good investment, they must either increase 
their interbank borrowing from other unit banks, or 
abandon some of the good investment. There are 
additional costs in either instance. For example, 
with additional borrowing, the cost to unit banks is 
increased by 
( ) ( )( ) 0
2
1 22 >−− iihih SPPk φθφθ . 
One way to improve the stability of the two-tier 
banking system is to create a lender of last resort – a 
central bank. During banking panics, the lender of 
last resort can sell government-back securities to 
recycle liquid funds to the banking system, thereby 
preventing costly asset liquidation2. It is interesting 
to see that a government deposit insurance scheme 
that provides coverage only to individual depositors, 
as is usually the case, may not prevent panic runs in 
the interbank market. Therefore, other forms of 
regulation, such as the creation of a central bank, 
may be necessary in an inter-connected banking 
system. In this regard, a globally linked banking 
                                                 
1 For related studies, see Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), and Qi 
(1994). 
2 In monetary economy, the central bank can also supply emergency 
liquidity by printing fiat money, effectively creating an ination tax. 
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system may also require a greater coordination 
among central banks in different countries to ensure 
stability. 
Conclusion 
This paper model an interbank market. It argues that 
branching restrictions would have no impact on 
bank credit allocation as long as interbank 
borrowing is not costly. However, with costly 
interbank borrowing, such restrictions would cause 
individual local banks to over-invest in liquid 
reserves and, as a result, such a banking system 
would have an aggregate liquidity surplus. A 
second-tier, correspondent bank is shown to 
mitigate this liquidity surplus problem by serving as 
the local banks' bank. Because of the reduced 
aggregate liquidity reserves and the increased 
interbank dependence, the two-tier banking system 
is more vulnerable to banking panics. A government 
sponsored lender of last resort – a central bank – 
may be necessary to maintain financial stability. 
The implications of the model seem to be consistent 
with casual observations of U.S. interbank markets, 
i.e., the Fed funds markets. The U.S. banking 
system consists of a large number of community-
based local banks that co-exist with a much smaller 
number of regional or national correspondent banks. 
The interbank flows of funds are facilitated through 
the overnight Fed funds markets1. Consistent with 
the story of a liquidity surplus among local banks, 
empirical evidence for the most part has 
documented that small banks are the net suppliers of 
liquid funds in the overnight interbank markets and 
large banks are the net users of such funds. 
However, there is little liquidity surplus in the entire 
banking system that includes the correspondent 
banks2. The fact that Fed funds are the surplus over 
regulatory reserve requirements does not invalidate 
this interpretation because the aggregate reserves by 
small banks persistently exceed the statutory 
minimum. The model seems also to be consistent 
with the observation that there is little interbank 
borrowing among small, local banks even though 
they do sometimes borrow from their own 
correspondent banks. The model suggests that 
interbank deposits are in the form of demand debt 
because of the private liquidity needs by individual 
local banks. Evidently, Fed fund borrowing is 
generally in the form of unsecured, callable, and 
automatically rolling-over overnight loans. 
At this point, I should discuss reasons for why the 
second-tier bank's interbank borrowing may not be 
as costly as similar borrowing among local banks. In 
addition to its better diversification, a correspondent 
bank, given its size, is likely to be more closely 
monitored by other stakeholders, such as large 
debtholders and governments. There are also greater 
concerns for reputation by such banks. The 
perception that large banks are “too-big-to-fail” may 
be beneficial as well. Interesting extensions of the 
present model would be to explicitly incorporate 
these factors. 
The model could also be extended in other 
directions. One could build a more general model 
with scale-dependent technologies. The interbank 
funds market could be examined in the context of 
interbank relationship building. For example, the 
correspondent relationships might be viewed as 
efforts by banks to develop long-term relationships 
that would reduce further costs associated with 
interbank borrowing. Finally, the model could be 
modified to examine policy issues relevant in the 
interbank market, such as the regulatory reserve 
requirements as well as the central bank's control of 
the interbank fund rate. 
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Appendix A. 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First, note that Pi; Si > 0, and 1≥γ  for rp sufficiently large. Consider now bank i's problem (2.1), given m(Bi) = 0. The 
Lagrangian is ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )  ,UUQ
PBrUSBrUQrPL
iiiiii
iiiuiiiqiipii
5432
11
λλαλαθλ
φαλγφα
+−++−+
−+++−−++=
 
where jλ 's, hereafter, will denote the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers. Then, given , Pi, Qi, Si, and iθ , for rp 
sufficiently large, the solution has ii θα = , Ui = Qi, and uiiiii rQSPB −−= φθ , with 01 >= γλ , 053 == λλ , 
( )( ) ( ) 0
1
1
12 >+
+=−+= φθ
φγφφλ piip
rP
Pr , and 
( )
0
1
1
4 >−+
+=−= qpuqu r
rr
rr φθ
φθγλ . 
To solve bank i's problem (2.2), I first substitute the optimal iα , Ui, and Bi into (5). Then, the Lagrangian of problem 
(2.2) is 
( ) ( )
( ) . SQPSQP
rQSPrPL
iiiiii
uiiipi
4321 1
1
λλλλ
γφθφθ
+++−−−+
−−−+=
 
Then, for rp sufficiently large, the solution has Pi + Si = 1, Qi = 0, and ( ) ( )φθφθγ ++= 1/1 pr  with 01 >= γλ , 
042 == λλ , and ( ) 013 >−= γλ ur . Finally, market clearing implies 
( ) ( ) 0
11
=−=−=∑∑
==
iii
n
i
iii
n
i
i SP nSPB φθφθ . 
By solving the market clearing condition and Pi + Si = 1 simultaneously, it follows that ( ) 11 −+= φθiP  and ( )φθφθ += 1/iS . Therefore, for rp sufficiently large, the collection of γ , Pi, Qi, Si, iα , Ui, and Bi is the unique 
interbank market equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
Appendix B.  
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The Lagrangian of the first-best problem (2.3) is ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) . SQP
PSSQPQrL qp
76543
21 1Pr1
λλλαλαθλ
αφλλφα
++++−+
−+−−−+++=
 
Then, for rp sufficiently large, the solution has ( ) 11 −+= φθP , Q = 0, ( )φθφθ += 1/S , and θα = , with 
( ) ( ) 01/121 >++== φθφθλλ pr , 0/13 >= θλλ P , 0754 === λλλ , and 016 >−= qrλλ . Therefore, α , P, Q, 
and S are the same as the corresponding investments in Proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C.  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
First, note that for k > k*( γ ), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++∈ φθφθ hhi   ,P 2
2
1
1 , and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++∈ φθ
φθ
φθ
φθ
h
h
h
h
i   ,S 12
. 
Consider now bank i's problem (2.1), given m(Bi) and iθ  as in (13) and (14). Then, the Lagrangian 
is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) . UUQ
PBrUSBmBrUQrPL
iiiiii
iiiuiiiiqiipii
5432
11
λλαλαθλ
φαλγφα
+−++−+
−+++−−−++=
 
If hi θθ = , bank i is a net borrower and 0≥iB ; then, m(Bi) = 2/2ikB . Given γ , Pi, Qi, and Si, for rp sufficiently large, 
the solution has hi θα = , Ui = Qi, and uiiihi rQSPB −−= φθ , with 
( )
0
1
1
1 >+
−+=+= φθ
γφθγλ
h
ph
i
r
kB , 
( )( ) ( )( ) 0
1
1
1 12 >+
++=−+= φθ
φγφφλφλ
h
ip
ip
Pr
Pr , 
053 == λλ , and ( ) 04 >−+= qui rrkBγλ . If 0=iθ , bank i is now a net lender and Bi < 0; then, m(Bi) = 0. Again, 
given γ , Pi, Qi, and Si, for rp sufficiently large, the solution has 0=iα , { ,,0 qui qu rr  if  Q rr  if   iU >≤= γγ  
And uiii rUSB −−= , with 01 >= γλ , ( )( ) 012 >−+= ip Pr γφφλ , 03 =λ , { ,0 ,04 ququ qu rr  if  rr rr  if              >>− ≤= γγ γλ  { ,0 .5 qu quuq rr  if                rr  if   0r-r >≤>= γγγλ  
Now, I proceed to solve bank i's problem (2.2). As it turns out, the optimal Pi, Qi, and Si are identical in either the case 
of γ ru > rq, or qu rr ≤γ . To avoid repetition, I only present the proof for the case of qu rr ≤γ . By substituting m(Bi), 
iθ , and the optimal iα , Ui, and Bi into (5), the Lagrangian of problem (2.2) is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) . SQPSQPSrQ
rQSPkrQSPrPL
iiiiiiiqi
uiiihuiiihpih
4321
2
0
1
2
1
2
11
2
1
λλλλγ
φθγφθφθ
+++−−−+++
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−−−+=
 
Then, given γ > 0, for rp sufficiently large and k > k*( γ ), the solution has Pi, Qi, and Si as in the proposition, with 
( ) 002/ 41 ==>−+= λλφθγλ 2iih    ,SPk , and ( )( ) ( ) 0211213 >+−+−−= quiihu rrSPrk γγφθλ .  
Therefore, the solutions to both problems are as given. Q.E.D. 
Appendix D.  
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Note that given γ  > 0, bank i's optimal choices Pi, Qi, Si, iα , Ui, and Bi are as in Proposition 3. What remains is to 
show that γ  = 1 is the unique interbank equilibrium loan return. In particular, if γ  < 1, no bank would want to lend 
funds at t = 1 because it is better off investing in the liquid technology. On the other hand, if γ  > 1, all banks with  
θ  = 0 would want to lend all of their liquid funds. In this case, however, for k > k*( γ ), the market would not clear 
since 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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2
2
1
2
1
2
11
<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+
+−++=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∑∑
==
φθ
φθ
φθ
γφθφθφθ
φθ
 
that is, there would be an excess supply of funds at t = 1. Therefore, the market equilibrium must have γ  = 1. Q.E.D. 
Appendix E.  
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Note that bank i's problems (4.1) and (4.2) are identical to problems (2.1) and (2.2). Thus, given γ  > 0, for rp 
sufficiently large and k > k*( γ ), the solutions to problems (4.1) and (4.2) are identical to those in Proposition 3. What 
remains is to solve the second-tier bank's problem (4.3). In particular, by substituting the optimal Pi, Qi, Si, iα , Ui, and 
Bi into (15) through (17), the Lagrangian of problem (4.3) is 
( ) ( ) ( )
.
2
4
1
2
5432
1
2
γλλλφθλ
λφθφθ
+++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+
−−++−−+=
ccihc
cciqciihpih
QSPnS
SQnSrQSPknrPnL
 
Then, the solution to problem (4.3) has ( )2/,2/ ihicihc PSnQ PnS φθφθ −== , and qr=γ , with qr== 21 λλ , and 
0543 === λλλ . Therefore, by substituting qr=γ  in the results of Proposition 3, the two-tier banking equilibrium is 
as established. Q.E.D. 
